Doctrine of Eclipse, Doctrine of Severability and Doctrine of Waiver

Synopsis: 

1. Introduction
2. Laws inconsistent with or in derogation of the fundamental rights
3. Doctrine of severability
4. Doctrine of Eclipse
5. Doctrine of Waiver
6. Conclusion

1. Introduction
   
   Part III of the Indian Constitution delineates six fundamental rights that are guaranteed to every individual. These rights are established to fulfill the aims articulated in the preamble of the Constitution. Together with the directive principles of state policy, they serve to uphold individual dignity. The state has an obligation to safeguard these rights, and no legislative provision can infringe upon them. A distinctive feature of these rights is found in Article 32, which offers constitutional remedies in instances of their infringement. Article 13 addresses laws that conflict with or undermine fundamental rights, detailing the implications of such laws under the Constitution. Specifically, Article 13(1) declares these laws void, and two relevant doctrines—eclipse and severability—apply to them. Additionally, the Doctrine of Waiver pertains to an individual’s ability to relinquish their rights.
   
2. Laws inconsistent with or in derogation of the fundamental rights
   
   All existing laws in India prior to the enactment of this constitution, to the extent that they conflict with the provisions outlined in this section, shall be rendered null and void. The State is prohibited from enacting any legislation that diminishes or infringes upon the rights granted by this section; any law enacted in violation of this provision shall be void to the degree of such violation. The term “law” encompasses any ordinance, order, by-law, rule, regulation, notification, custom, or practice that possesses legal authority within the territory of India. “Laws in force” refers to those statutes enacted by a legislature or other authority under this Constitution that have not been repealed, regardless of whether any such law or any portion thereof is currently in effect, either generally or in specific regions.
   
3. Doctrine of severability
   
   The principle referred to as the doctrine of separability serves to safeguard Fundamental Rights. According to clause 1 of Article 13 of the Constitution, any laws that were in effect in India prior to the Constitution’s enactment, which conflict with the provisions of Fundamental Rights, shall be rendered void to the extent of that conflict. Importantly, this does not imply that the entire law or act is invalid; rather, only those specific provisions that are inconsistent with Fundamental Rights are affected. The essence of the Doctrine of Severability lies in the ability to isolate the conflicting portion from the remainder of the law. However, if the valid and invalid components are so intricately intertwined that separation is unfeasible, the entire law or act will be deemed invalid.
   
   In the case of A.K. Gopalan v. State of Madras, the Supreme Court determined that when a provision of an Act is found to be in conflict with the Constitution, only the conflicting provision will be rendered void, rather than the entire Act. The Court emphasized the importance of preserving as much of the legislation as possible. If the removal of the invalid provision does not alter the fundamental nature or structure of the legislative intent, it is considered severable. The Court concluded that, with the exception of Section 14, all other sections of the Preventive Detention Act of 1950 were valid, and since Section 14 could be separated from the remainder of the Act, the detention of the petitioner was deemed lawful.
   
   In the case of State of Bombay v. F.N. Balsara, the Supreme Court invalidated eight sections of the Bombay Prohibition Act, asserting that the portions deemed invalid due to their infringement on fundamental rights were separable from the remaining provisions of the Act.
   
   In the case of R.M.D.C. v. Union of India, the Supreme Court provided significant insights into the Doctrine of Severability, as articulated by Justice Venkatarama Aiyar: 

1. The determination of whether the valid components of a statute can be separated from its invalid components hinges primarily on the legislative intent. The critical inquiry is whether the legislature would have enacted the valid provisions had it been aware of the invalidity of the remaining sections.
2. Should the valid and invalid provisions be so intricately intertwined that they cannot be disentangled, the invalidity of any part necessitates the invalidation of the entire statute. Conversely, if the valid provisions are sufficiently distinct and can stand alone as a coherent legal framework after the invalid portions are removed, they will be upheld, even if the remaining parts are rendered unenforceable.
3. Furthermore, even if the valid provisions are separate from the invalid ones, if they collectively constitute a unified scheme intended to function as a whole, the invalidation of any segment will lead to the collapse of the entire framework.
4. Similarly, when the valid and invalid provisions operate independently and do not contribute to a cohesive scheme, if the remaining valid provisions are so diminished that they fundamentally alter the original legislative intent, the statute will be deemed invalid in its entirety.
5. The question of separability between valid and invalid provisions is not contingent upon whether they are contained within the same section or distributed across different sections. Rather, it is the essence of the provisions that matters, which must be assessed through a comprehensive examination of the statute and the context of the relevant provisions. 
6. If the remaining provisions of the statute, following the removal of the invalid section, cannot be enforced without necessitating alterations or modifications, then the entire statute must be deemed void; otherwise, it would constitute an act of judicial legislation.
7. In assessing the legislative intent regarding the issue of separability, it is appropriate to consider the legislative history, the purpose of the statute, as well as its title and preamble.

4. Doctrine of Eclipse
   
   The doctrine of eclipse posits that any legislation that conflicts with fundamental rights lacks validity. Such legislation is not entirely extinguished; rather, it is obscured by the fundamental right. The conflict between the challenged law and the fundamental right can be resolved through a constitutional amendment to the pertinent fundamental right, thereby eliminating the eclipse and restoring the law’s validity. In essence, as long as a legal provision contravenes a fundamental right enshrined in the Indian Constitution, it remains inactive and ineffective. However, if Parliament amends the fundamental right in question, resulting in the law no longer infringing upon that right, the law is then revitalized and becomes operational.
   
   These eclipsed laws remain applicable to all transactions that occurred prior to the Constitution’s enactment, as well as for the enforcement of rights acquired and obligations incurred before that time. They remain dormant and ineffective solely in relation to citizens of the country, while still being enforceable against non-citizens who do not possess the fundamental rights guaranteed by the Constitution.
   
   In the case of Bhikaji Narain Dhakras v. State of Madhya Pradesh, the Central Provinces and Berar Motor Vehicles (Amendment) Act, 1947 amended Section 43 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939, both of which were enacted prior to the Constitution. This Amendment Act granted the Provincial Government the authority to assume control over the entire Provincial Motor Transport Business, which was deemed to infringe upon Article 19(1)(g). Following a constitutional amendment to Article 19(1)(g), the State was authorized to conduct business, leading to a challenge against the government notification issued in this regard. The Supreme Court determined that the contested law was temporarily overshadowed by the fundamental right. The enactment of the Constitution Act, 1951 effectively eliminated this overshadowing, rendering the contested act free from any defects or invalidity.
   
   
   In the case of Keshavan Madhava Menon vs. State of Bombay, the legislation under scrutiny was the Press and Regulation of Books Act. The primary provision of this statute mandated that prior approval from relevant authorities was required before any publication could occur. Failure to obtain such consent rendered the individual criminally liable under a subsequent provision. The aggrieved party initiated a suit claiming a violation of Article 19(1)(a), which guarantees the right to freedom of speech and expression. The Hon’ble Supreme Court, under Article 13(1), was justified in assessing the law’s validity, and through the doctrine of eclipse, the law was deemed dormant. However, the individual had no recourse since the cause of action arose prior to the Constitution’s enactment, which does not possess retrospective applicability.

5. Doctrine of Waiver
   
   The doctrine of waiver posits that an individual possessing a right or privilege may relinquish that entitlement voluntarily, provided such a decision is made of their own accord. This principle is predicated on the belief that individuals are best equipped to assess their own interests in the context of legal obligations and that they possess an understanding of the implications of renouncing such rights. However, it is important to note that this doctrine does not extend to the fundamental rights enshrined in the Constitution of India. These rights are established for the collective benefit of society rather than for the sole advantage of individuals. Consequently, the doctrine of waiver cannot be invoked to forfeit fundamental rights.
   
   In case of Krishna Bahadur vs. Purna Theatres and others , The Hon’ble Supreme Court determined that when a statute establishes conditions for an individual’s benefit, that individual may waive their rights, provided that no public interest is at stake. Furthermore, the party relinquishing such rights must demonstrate a contractual basis for this waiver, typically in the context of a compromise. The behavior of the individual waiving their rights may also be taken into account. However, it is important to note that fundamental rights are not merely general rights afforded to individuals, making their waiver significantly more complex than that of general statutory rights. The landmark ruling concerning the doctrine of waiver is elaborated.
   
   Another case Basheshar Nath vs. CIT where Justice P.N. Bhagwati articulated that fundamental rights are safeguarded by the Supreme Court under the Indian Constitution, and permitting individuals to waive these rights would constitute a misuse of these essential protections. The Hon’ble Supreme Court further asserted that the waiver of fundamental rights is impermissible, reasoning that: “These fundamental rights have not been enshrined in the Constitution solely for individual benefit, although they ultimately serve to protect individual rights. They have been incorporated as a matter of public policy, and the doctrine of waiver cannot be applied to legal provisions enacted as a matter of constitutional policy.”

6. Conclusion
   
   Fundamental Rights in India represent a distinctive aspect of its Constitution. Dr. B.R. Ambedkar articulated a dual purpose for these rights: first, to ensure that every individual can enjoy them, and second, to impose a binding obligation on all authorities. Consequently, when any legislation or action conflicts with an individual’s fundamental rights, either the Doctrine of Eclipse or the Doctrine of Severability is invoked to prioritize these rights over the conflicting laws. Furthermore, the Doctrine of Waiver prohibits any individual from relinquishing their fundamental rights under any circumstances. As the term implies, Fundamental Rights are unequivocally regarded as paramount in India and are safeguarded more effectively than in many other democratic or non-democratic nations.